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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
EBEN BLOMQUIST,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.

Case No. 15496

J. DAL PETERSON and KARL D.
BLOMQUIST and MINERALS
RECOVERY COMPANY, aka MINERAL
RECOVERY CORPORATION, a Utah
corporation,
Defendant-Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action for the collection of a promissory note.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt
Lake County, the Honorable David B. Dee, denied plaintiff's
motion for summary judgment and granted the motion for summary judgment of defendant Minerals Recovery Corporation.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant Minerals Recovery Corporation prays the
judgment be affirmed, and that it be awarded its costs on
appeal.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On June 11, 1974, a promissory note in the amount
of $10,222 was executed by Eben Blomquist, plaintiff, and by
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

- 2 two of the individual defendants, Karl D. Blomquist and

J. Dal Peterson.

The promissory note did not indicate that

it was secured by any collateral; there was no reference to
the mining equipment which is the subject of this appeal.
In fact, only the following notation appeared at the bottom
of the document:

"This note is secured by a Security Agree-

ment of even date."

(R.48,75.)

Notwithstanding the nota-

tion on the promissory note, the plaintiff and the individual
defendants did not execute a formal, written security agreement pursuant to the Utah Uniform Commercial Code, §§70A-9-101,
et seq., Utah Code Ann.

(1953).

(R. 46-48; 88.)

Subsequent to the execution of the promissory
note, the plaintiff and the two individual defendants executed a financing statement and filed it with the Secretary
of State of Utah on August 7, 1974.

(R.48; 73-74.)

The

document is a standard form UCC-1 financing statement; this
fact is evidenced by the notation at the bottom of the
statement itself (R.48; 74), and is admitted by plaintiff.
(R.88.)

The financing statement does not refer to a secu-

rity interest in any property, nor does it even refer to the
promissory note between the parties.
The maturity date of the promissory note was September 1, 1974 (R.48; 75), and evidently, according to
plaintiff, the principal amount was never paid.

Accordingly,

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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- 3 on August 27, 1976, plaintiff brought an action in the Third
Judicial District Court against the two individual defendants in order to collect the principal of the promissory
note.

The complaint also alleged that payment of the note

was secured by a piece of mining equipment, a "belt tank."
Since the mining equipment was in the possession of Minerals
Recovery Corporation (herein "MRC") at the time the original
complaint was filed, MRC was listed as a defendant, too.
(R. 2-5.)

On October 13, 1976, plaintiff and one of the
individual defendants, Karl D. Blomquist, stipulated that
the mining equipment could. be sold and that the proceeds
from the sale could be applied against the outstanding
balance of the promissory note.

(R.69.)

Then, on Febru-

ary 9, 1977, plaintiff obtained a default judgment on the
promissory note against the other individual defendant,
J. Dal Peterson.

(R. 39-41.)

On June 9, 1977, plaintiff filed a motion for
summary judgment against MRC, contending that the promissory
note was secured by the mining equipment in the possession
of MRC.

(R.67.)

On July 11, 1977, MRC filed its own motion

for summary judgment.

(R.86.)

MRC contended that the

security interest alleged by plaintiff was not enforceable
against it since the plaintiff and the two individual defendants had not executed a valid security agreement, pursuant
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

- 4 to the requirements of §70A-9-203 of the Utah Uniform Commercial Code, covering the promissory note and the mining
equipment.

(R. 22.)
Both motions were heard on July 14, 1977.

(R. 95.)

On September 30, 1977, the court, the Honorable David B. Dee
presiding, entered its order, denying the plaintiff's motion
for swmnary judgment and granting the swmnary judgment
motion of MRC.

(R.112-113.)

The court held in its accom-

panying Memorandum Decision that:
• . . a reading of 70-A-9-203 Utah Code
Annotated (1953) does not allow the creation of a security agreement under th~
facts in this case taking the Promissory
Note and Financing Statement together
with and reading them in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff and therefore
the plaintiff's Motion For Summary Judgment is denied and the defendant Mineral
Recovery Company's Motion For Summary
Judgment is granted.
(R.124.)
The plaintiff appeals from that decision.
ARGUMENT
Introduction
The plaintiff contends he has a valid and enforceable security interest in the mining equipment currently
possessed by MRC.

He has based this assertion on the ra-

tionale that the promissory note and the financing statement
between himself and the two individual defendants meet the
requirements of a written security agreement under §§70A-9-20l,
-204, Utah Code Ann.

(1953).

In order to determine whether
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- 5 -

the parties have properly created a security agreement in
the course of their transactions, and thereby obtained a
security interest in the mining equipment, attention must
first be directed to the specific requirements of the Utah
Uniform Commercial Code itself·.
A security agreement is an agreement which creates
and provides for a security interest,* and a security interest is an interest in personal property which secures payment on performance of an obligation.**
Utah Code Ann.

Section 70A-9-203(1),

(1953), specifies the requisites for the

enforceability of a security interest; it provides in pertinent part:
Subject to the provisions of section
70A-9-208 on the security interest of a
collecting bank and section 70A-9-113 on
a security interest arising under the chapter on sales, a security interest is not
enforceable against the debtor or third
parties unless
(a)
the collateral is in the
possession of the secured party; or
(b)
the debtor has signed a
security agreement which contains a
description of the collateral • •
{Emphasis added.)

*Section 70A-9-105 (1) (h), Utah Code Ann.

(1953) ·

**Section 70A-l-201(37), Utah Code Anno.

(1953).
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- 6 In addition, §70A-9-204(1), Utah Code Ann.

(1953), specifies

the requisities for the attachment of a security interest;
it provides:
A security interest cannot attach
until there is agreement (subsection (3)
of section 70A-l-201) that it attach and
value is given and the debtor has rights
in the collateral.
It attaches as soon
as all of the events in the preceding sentence have taken place unless explicit
agreement postpones the time of attaching.
The above two provisions, §70A-9-203 and §70A-9-204, incorporate four general requirements for the creation and enforcement against third parties of a valid security interest:
(1)

The debtor must acquire rights in the col-

lateral;
(2)

The secured party must give value;

(3)

There must be an agreement specifically

creating or providing for a security interest in particular property; and
(4)

The debtor must have signed a security agree-

ment containing a description of the collateral; or the
secured party must acquire possession of the collateral.
The first two requirements do not have particular importance
in this lawsuit.

We are primarily concerned with the last

two, since they are responsible for the general imposition
on contracting parties of a formal, written security agreement.

And, there must be a binding security agreement in
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- 7 order to make the security interest enforceable against
innocent third parties.
It has always been conceded by plaintiff that a
formal, written security agreement was never executed by
himself and the two individual defendants.

(R.46-48; 88.)

It is his contention, however, that courts in other jurisdictions have recognized "substitutes" to such formal security agreements.

The present inquiry is, therefore, which

combination of papers, documents or agreements can qualify
under the foregoing provisions of the Uniform Commercial
Code to create an enforceable security agreement against
third parties.

Defendant contends that neither of the two

documents before the Court, individually or taken together,
constitutes an adequate security agreement which created or
provided for a security interest in the mining equipment.
Plaintiff's Promissory Note and the Financing Statement
Do Not Create an Enforceable Security Agreement
Against Defendant MRC
A.

A Financing Statement May Not Be Enforced as a
Security Agreement.
When considering whether the financing statement

prepared by the parties was to serve as a security agreement, first note that the financing statement was a standard
form.

This observation is borne out by the notation at the

bottom of the financing statement (R.48; 74), and it has
been admitted by the plaintiff, too.

(R.88.)

The over-

whelming general rule is that the Uniform Commercial Code
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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makes no provision for a naked, standard form financing
statement to be enforced as a security agreement.

See, Mid-

Eastern Electronics, Inc. v. First National Bank of Southern
Maryland, 380 F.2d 355 (_4th Cir. 1967); General Electric Credit.
Corp. v. Bankers Commercial Corp., 244 Ark. 984, 429 S.W.2d
60 (1968); M. Rutkin Elec. Supply Co. v. Burdette Elec., Inc ..
98 N.J.Super. 378, 237 A.2d 500 (1967); Cain v. Country Club
Delicatessen, 25 Conn.Supp. 327, 203 A.2d 441 (1964); American
Card Co. v. H.M.H. Co., 97 R.I. 59, 196 A.2d 150 (1963).
The reasoning underlying this position was aptly
expressed in Needle v. Lasco Industries, Inc., 10 Cal.App.2d
1105, 89 Cal.Rptr. 593

(1970).

In that case, a retailer was

being supplied with merchandise for sale on a consignment
basis to its customers by a wholesaler.

The retailer sold

some of the merchandise without paying the wholesaler,
whereupon the latter ceased to provide any more merchandise.
Later, a representative of the wholesaler met with the
president of the retailer to discuss the delinquest account.
The wholesaler offered to deliver additional merchandise
provided the retailer would furnish security in the form of
its inventory and accounts receivable.

The retailer agreed

to do so, and the wholesaler filled in the blanks of a
document entitled "Financing Statement."

The document was

executed on behalf of the retailer by its president and vice
president, and on behalf of the wholesaler by its secretary.
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It was thereafter filed in the office of the secretary of
state.
The wholesaler resumed supplying merchandise to
the retailer.

The retailer's business continued to be poor,

and eventually the retailer was forced to make a general
assignment to the plaintiff, a third party, in the approximate amount of $6,000 for the benefit of its creditors.

At

that same time, the retailer owed the wholesaler approximately $4,600; accordingly, the wholesaler claimed that it
was entitled to the entire amount due to it, on the basis
that it was a preferred creditor under the financing statement.

The plaintiff brought an action for declaratory

relief against the wholesaler, putting in issue only one
matter pertinent here:

Whether the financing statement

constituted an enforceable security agreement.
The trial court concluded that the financing
statement was a valid security agreement, and the plaintiff
appealed.

The California Court of Appeals reversed, basing

its reversal on two considerations.

First, the financing

statement failed to express any evidence of an agreement by
the debtor to grant the claimants a security interest in
specific collateral.

Second, although the financing state-

ment described the collateral, there was no indication of
the underlying obligation for which the collateral was security.

For all that appeared from the writing, the obliga-

tion secured may have been a loan from the wholesaler to the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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- 10 retailer which was subsequently repaid and might not have
encompassed the retailer's obligation to the wholesaler for
merchandise delivered.

A security interest is collateral

which secures payment or performance of an obligation, and
the security agreement is effective only according to its
terms between the parties and against third parties.

At a

minimum, therefore, the terms must recite the obligation
secured.

The court suggested that the appropriate language

was a grant of a security interest "to secure the performance of the obligation set out in paragraph l," i.e., a
paragraph in the agreement which fully sets out the obligation.
Plaintiff in the instant case must agree with the
foregoing reasoning, for in his trial memorandum he stated:
The financing statement of the instant case
contains no language specifically granting
a security interest, nor are any of the
terms of the agreement specified.
It is
arguable that the statement does not contain language sufficient to evidence the
requisite intent to grant a security interest.
(R. 91.)
It should be borne in mind that a financing state·
ment and a security agreement serve entirely different functions.

The security agreement embodies the entire obliga-

tions, responsibilities and arrangements between the parties.
The filing of a financing statement, on the other hand, is
" . . . but . . . a single step in the means by which the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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rights and priorities of a secured party are 'perfected'."
Mid-Eastern Electronics, supra, 380 F.2d at 356.

It is

simply a notice that the party who has filed it may have a
security interest in the collateral which the statement
describes.

Therefore,
. . it is clear that the rights of a
third person do not depend upon whether
he has examined any financing statement.
If the [creditor) and [debtor) had executed a security agreement but had not
filed a financing statement, the security
agreement would not make the [creditor)
a preferred creditor even though none
of the other creditors bothered to ascertain whether a financing statement had
been filed . . . The necessary corollary
of this proposition is that a financing
statement filed with respect to a security
agreement which never comes into existence
is a nullity. Needle v. Lasco Industries,
Inc., Cal.App.2d 1105, 1108, 89 Cal.Rptr.
593, 596 (1970).
(Emphasis added.)

B.

A Promissory Note May Not Be Enforced as a Security Agreement.
Similar to the naked financing statement, a prom-

issory note cannot substitute for a valid and enforceable
security agreement since it does not usually contain "granting"
language.

This issue was adequately addressed by an opinion

from New Jersey, First County National Bank & Trust Co. v.
Canna, 124 N.J.Super. 154, 305 A.2d 442 (App.Div. 1973).

In

that case, the court had before it both a homemade promissory note which stated that the loan was for the purchase of
an automobile, and the automobile certificate of title on
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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- 12 which appeared a notation that the lender was a secured
party.

The latter notation was required in order to perfect

the lender's security interest.

There was no document

formally entitled "security agreement."

The court was asked

to construe the documents before it as constituting a security interest under the New Jersey Commercial Code.

In

holding that they could not be so interpreted, the court
stated:
By its very nature an agreement creating
a security interest in collateral, of
necessity, must contain language that
grants or creates a security interest in
the collateral.
In short, the language
must be such as to clearly indicate that
the debtor intended to thereby specifically
grant to the creditor a security interest
in the collateral. Absent such language
the writing does not constitute a security
interest.
305 A.2d at 446.
Accordingly, the court held that a promissory note which
does not contain language granting a security interest in
collateral, even where it recites the data relating to
collateral as security, is not thereby converted into a
security agreement.

The decision in Canna was based on the

absence of language in any of the documents which granted a
security interest.

The court implied that if there were

such granting language in a promissory note or elsewhere, it
would have found a valid security agreement.
In the instant case, neither the promissory note
nor the financing statement contain language, as required by
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to grant a security interest in the mining equipment.

The promissory note does not refer to any collateral, nor
mention the grant of a security interest; it only recites
that it is secured by a security agreement of even date.
Moreover, the financing statement only recites that "this
financing statement covers the following types (or items) of
property:", and then the statement refers to the mining
equipment.

Neither instrument clearly shows that the debtor

intended to grant a security interest and, therefore, neither
document can be held to grant a security interest to the
plaintiff.

c.

The Promissory Note and Financing Statement, Taken
Together, May Not Be Enforced as a Security Agreement.
As in other contract settings involving a statute

of frauds requirement, two or more writings can often be
incorporated to satisfy the written security agreement
requirement under §70A-9-203 and §70A-9-204.

Similar to a

financing statement or a promissory note, the determining
factor is whether the multiple documents, taken together,
clearly reveal a specific grant by the debtor of a security
interest in the collateral.

An illustrative case is In re Carmichael Enterprises, Inc., 9 U.C.C.Rep. 990 (N.D.Ga. 1971).

There, the

court determined that a financing statement sufficed as a
valid security agreement since it was attended by numerous
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

- 14 other documents.

For example, the creditor offered in

evidence a letter from its assistant credit manager to the
vice president of the debtor corporation.

The letter stated,

in part:
In accordance with our several phone conversations, the following will outline our
requirements which will enable us to extend additional time on the payment of
·your indebtedness to us. Our arrangement
will be formalized by a loan agreement containing the following provisions:

* * *
5. Execution of a Financing
Statement in which accounts receivable inventory and proceeds thereof
are provided as collateral for the
above indebtedness.
In addition, the creditor offered to the court another
letter and financing statement which were subsequently sent
to the debtor corporation.

The letter set forth the terms

of the loan agreement and recited that in consideration for
the creditor's acceptance of the debtor's notes to cover its
debt, the debtor must agree to execute and return the enclosed standard form financing statement.

The second letter

was, in turn, signed on behalf of the debtor corporation by
its vice president, bearing the date of his signature and
the notation:

"Agreed."

The financing statement, enclosed

in the letter, was also signed on behalf of the debtor
corporation by its vice president.

On the basis of this

extensive documentation, the court held that the creditor
obtained a security agreement from the debtor.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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- 15 A similar result was expressed in In re Truckers
International, Inc., Sage v. City of Mount Vernon, 17 U.C.C.Rep.
1337 (W.D.Wash. 1975).

In that case a bankrupt truck dealer

had not signed a document officially designated as a security

agreement with a truck manufacturer.

Nevertheless,

the combination of the following multiple documents executed
between the parties required the conclusion by the court
that a security agreement, sufficient under the Uniform
Commercial Code, had been executed:

A dealership agreement,

a financing statement, a signatory authorization (under
which specified representatives of the manufacturer were
appointed agents for the dealer and were permitted to execute notes and security instruments on behalf of the dealer
and in favor of the manufacturer), and a dealer note.

It

was the court's conclusion that, taken as a whole, the preceding documentation contemplated and provided for secured
credit transactions between the parties.
A similar result was reached in the opinion of
In re Munroe Builders, Inc., 20 u.c.c.Rep. 739 (W.D.Mich.
1976).

There, the defendant had entered into a written

contract with a municipality for the construction of a ski
resort building.

In order to obtain the necessary construc-

tion proceeds, the defendant executed four promissory notes
with a bank.
security.

The notes contained various descriptions of

The first bore the notation:

"Chocolay Township

Warming House"; the second bore the notation:

"Chocolay
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- 16 Township Warming House"; the third bore the notation:
"Secured by check assignment"; and the fourth bore no description of security.

Later, in a letter to the supervisor

of the municipality, the defendant wrote the following:
• • . I, the undersigned, president
of Munroe Builders, Inc., hereby request
and authorize you to send all the money
due this complany (sic} upon completion
of the warming house project to the Peoples
State Bank of Munising to be credited to
my account for payment of the construction
loan granted to us for construction of subject project.
This authorization is voluntarily
given to procure construction funds for
the above project and it is irrevocable.
20 U.C.C.Rep., at 740.
The municipal supervisor, in turn, wrote the bank that the
"assignment" was accepted subject to the rights of the
municipality.

There was no filing of a financing statement

by either party, the defendant corporation or the bank.

On

this basis, the court concluded that the four promissory
notes and the two letters, taken together, satisfied the
requirements for a valid, written security agreement between
the parties.

See also, Morey Machinery Co., Inc. v. Great

Western Industrial Machinery Co., 16 U.C.C.Rep. 489 (5th
Cir. 1975).
It is absolutely essential to observe that the
foregoing cases require the multiple documents to evidence
the specific intent of the debtor to grant a security interest in particular property to the creditor.

Those multiple
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- 17 documents which satisfy this requirement typically involve
more significant and detailed documents, and a greater
number, than are involved in the instant case.

Even the

opinions cited by the plaintiff in his appeal brief evidence
this conclusion.

(Brief of Appellant, at 7-8.)

For instance,

In re Arnex-Protein Development Corp., 504 F.2d 1056 (9th
Cir. 1974), a promissory note, a financing statement and
several invoices; In re Numeric Corp., 485 F.2d 1328 (1st
Cir. 1973), a financing statement, a resolution of the corporate directors of the debtor establishing that an agreement in fact existed to give the secured party a security
interest, and an itemization of the collateral; In re Penn
Housing, 367 F.Supp. 661 {W.D.Pa. 1973), a financing statement, eleven promissory notes, an acknowledgment of the debt
by a letter which also pledged security, and an extensive
course of dealing between the parties; In re Matronics,
Inc., 2 u.c.C.Rep. 364 {D.Conn. 1964), a financing statement, a promissory note, and a loan agreement.
There are, of course, numerous cases in which the
courts have concluded that the parties failed to create a
valid and enforceable security agreement, notwithstanding
the existence of multiple documents between them.

See,

e.g., Crete State Bank, Crete, Nebraska, v. Lauhoff Grain
Co., 195 Neb. 605, 239 N.W.2d 789 (1976); Land
Asch, 267 Md. 251, 297 A.2d 285 (1972).

v

Co. v.

There are two such
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opinions which are strikingly similar to the instant case.
Both involved a promissory note and a financing statement,
and in each case the court concluded that the parties had
not created a valid and enforceable security agreement
between themselves.

The first is Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical

Sales, Inc. v. Hurst, 176 N.W.2d 166 (Iowa, 1970).

In that

case the plaintiff sold farm supplies to the defendant, and
the defendant executed a promissory note in payment of the
account.

The note contained the following handwritten

notation:
March 9,

"This note covered by security agreement dated
'67."

Thereafter, a financing statement was exe-

cuted by the plaintiff and defendant and appropriately
filed.

No formal security agreement was signed, either then

or later.
Sometime later, the defendant sold his farm produce to third parties and neglected to pay his note.

Ac-

cordingly, the plaintiff started an action to collect the
amount due it, relying upon the claim that the execution of
the promissory note and the financing statement, together
with the filing of the latter document, created a security
interest in the farm produce.

In its opinion the court

provided the following discussion:
The cases uniformly hold that a financing
statement does not ordinarily create a
security interest.
It merely gives notice
that one is or may be claimed. The same
authorities hold a financing statement
may double as a security agreement if it
contains appropriate language which grants
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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- 19 a security interest. The financing statement now before us contains no language
which can be interpreted as granting such
an interest.
It is apparent a financing statement
was not intended under the Uniform Commercial Code to serve as a security agreement.
Section 554.9402, Code of Iowa, provides
in part:
(1)
A financing statement is
sufficient if it is signed by the
debtor and the secured party, gives
an address of the secured party from
which information concerning the
security may be obtained, gives a
mailing address of the debtor and
contains a statement indicating the
types, or describing the items, of
collateral. A financing statement
may be filed before a security agreement is made or a security interest
otherwise attaches . . • .
Quite obviously, if the security interest
may come into existence after the financing
statement is filed, such---stat'ement does
not create the lien.
We hold that the financing statement
signed by the parties and filed with the
recorder . . . afforded plaintiff no security interest in the [farm produce] sold
by defendant • . . .
(All emphasis the
court's.)
7 U.C.C.Rep. at 732.
The second opinion is Barth Brothers v. Billings,
68 Wis.2d 80, 227 N.W.2d 673 (1975).

In that case two

separate parties both made claims against the defendant.
One of the plaintiffs based its claim on four promissory
notes signed by the defendant.

All four notes contained a

notation which basically provided that each of them was
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secured by a financing statement filed with tle local registrar of deeds.

Financing statements for three of the notes

were appropriately filed within ten days of the notes being
signed.

The plaintiff claimed that it had a security inter-

est in the defendant's property based on the notes signed by
the defendant with the notation that they were secured by
filed financing statements.
The court disagreed, holding that there is no
valid security interest where the debtor executes a promissory note and signs a financing statement, but does not
sign a security agreement.

The court accepted the reasoning

of the majority of the courts that a financing statement may
double as a security agreement only if it contains appropriate language which grants a security interest.

No secu-

rity interest existed in the case because the financing
statements did not contain any language granting such an
interest.
The two documents in the instant matter are similar to those in Kaiser and Barth Brothers.

The promissory

note does not refer to collateral or to a security interest.
Rather, the note's only significant notation is that it was
allegedly "secured by a security agreement of even date."
Of course the security agreement to which the note refers
never existed, either then or now.

The only additional

document which the parties executed was the financing statement.

And it, too, is barren of language sufficient to
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- 21 justify the conclusion that through it the plaintiff obtained a security interest in the mining equipment.

These

documents, together or separately, are not the equivalent of
a formal security agreement as required by the Utah Uniform
Commercial Code.
The main opinion on which the plaintiff relies is
In re Center Auto Parts, 6 U.C.C.Rep. 398 (C.D.Calif. 1968).
(Brief of Appellant, at pp.10-15.)

In Auto Parts, a prom-

issory note and a financing statement were held to constitute a security agreement.

The crucial factors relied upon

by the court were the contemporaneous signing of both documents by the debtor and the following language in the promissory note:
statement."

"This note is secured by a certain financing
The opinion is inapplicable in the instant

matter for at least two reasons.
minority view.

First, it represents a

In fact, an opinion cited by the plaintiff

in his own appeal brief wholly rejected it.
Appellant, at pp.9, 13.)

(Brief of

In Evans v. Everett, 10 N.C.App.

435, 179 s.E.2d 120 (1971), the North Carolina Court of
Appeals provided the following comment on the Auto Parts
opinion:
In Center, the federal trial court, reviewing a decision of a referee in bankruptcy held those words to be sufficient
to create or provide for a security interest. A description of the collateral
was provided by the financing statement,
which, it was stipulated, was the only
one between the parties.
Even if it
were stipulated that the note and the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

- 22 -

two financing statements in the present
case were the only ones between the
parties. we do not regard the words,
"This note is secured by Uniform Commercial Code financing statement of
North Carolina" is a sufficient grant
of a security interest, and therefore
do not consider the reasoning in that
case persuasive.
8 U.C.C.Rep. at 1367.
Second, the crucial language in the Auto Parts opinion
(i.e., "this note is secured by a certain financing statement"), is different from that in the instant matter (i.e.,
"this promissory note is secured by a security agreement of
even date").

In Auto Parts, the promissory note might have

led an inquirer to the written document which the parties
intended all to see, namely, the financing statement.

Thus,

by looking to the financing statement, the property provided
by the debtor as security for the loan was identified.

In

the instant case, any inquirer who had read the promissory
note would have looked in vain for the security agreement to
which it refers.
CONCLUSION
Neither of the two documents before the Court,
individually or taken together, constitute an adequate
security agreement under the relevant provisions of the Utah
Uniform Commercial Code.

The plaintiff did not obtain a

security interest in the mining equipment possessed by MRC.
The summary Judgment should be affirmed and defendant should be awarded its costs on appeal.
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DATED this 17th day of February, 1978.
Respectfully submitted,
MOYLE & DRAPER

By
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Salt Lake City, Utah 8411I
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Certificate of Service
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies
of the foregoing Brief of Respondent were mailed, postage
prepaid, to Lorin N. Pace and Randall Bunnell, attorneys for
plaintiff-appellant, 431 South Third East, B-1, Salt Lake
City, Utah, this 17th day of February, 1978.
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